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FROM FREEMAN TO BROWN AND BACK AGAIN:
PRINCIPLE, PRAGMATISM, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION DECISIONS
David Crump*
Abstract. A court deciding a constitutional case should announce a clear principle, one
that the people can easily understand and follow. At the same time, such a decision should be
pragmatic, in that it should effectively accomplish its goals while treating all affected persons
fairly. The simultaneous fulfillment of these two criteria, however, can sometimes be
extraordinarily difficult. In this article, Professor Crump considers how well the school
desegregation remedies ordered by the Supreme Court fit the tests of principle and
pragmatism. He concludes that the early decisions, as well as many of the later ones, do not
achieve both goals, but there is hopeful prospect that the recent termination-of-supervision
decisions may fulfill them better.

In Freeman v. Pitts,' the Supreme Court recognized that a district
court could be permitted to stop supervising pupil assignments in a
school system that once was unconstitutionally segregated. The Court
reached this result even though the school system in question (which was
in DeKalb County, Georgia) had never become "integrated." 2 In fact, it
was arguable that the system had never even been "desegregated" in
student composition; for this reason, the Court's opinion included a
demonstration that the concept of a "unitary" school system had no fixed
meaning Furthermore, the Court held that the supervision of pupil
assignments might be withdrawn even though effects of unconstitutional
segregation still persisted in certain other aspects of the school system,
including funding, educational quality, and faculty assignments.4
Freeman is the most recent in a trilogy of cases in which the Court has
allowed the possibility of retreat from intrusive school desegregation
decrees. The other two cases are Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler 5 and Board of Education v. Dowell.6 Freeman is by far the
*

Professor of Law, University of Houston; A.B., Harvard College, 1966; J.D., University of

Texas, 1969.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
2. The law does not require "integration" as such; instead, it requires elimination of vestiges of de
jure segregation. See infra parts ll(A)-(B). At times, however, the distinctions have become
blurred. See infra part I.
3. See infra part IV(A).
4. See infra part IV(A).
5. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
6. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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deepest and most searchingly philosophical of the three. It is an opinion
that, in places, shows a Court whose heart is at war with its head. In fact,
many of the Court's members see two contradictory -truths in the facts
underlying Freemanv. Pitts.
On the one hand, the Freeman case could be an occasion for genuine
rejoicing, or at least for more-than-mild enthusiasm, because of the hardwon accomplishments and real hope for the future that it showcases. The
Court upheld fact findings, which on the record seem debatable but
defensible, that the school system had achieved unitary status in pupil
assignments by its efforts over the years.7 The potential removal of court
supervision in this area enabled the Court to include in its opinion a
soaring, almost romantic description of reliance on democracy and the
virtues of political accountability in an era of race neutrality! More
concretely, the results of the school board's efforts included measurable
and significant educational gains for African-American children.'
On the other hand, there is an unpleasant side to Freeman. Three
justices pointed out without contradiction that during the thirty-eight
0 the children
years after Brown v. Board of Education,1
of DeKalb
County "never have attended a desegregated school system even for one
day."" The schools remained, at the very least, racially "unbalanced": in
the eyes of the same three justices, they had a "glaring dual character...
part 'white' and part 'black."".. The district court's findings that this
condition resulted from private migration decisions, which had produced
segregated housing patterns, did not remove the cloud from the district
court's decision. 3 Indeed, the opinion of the Supreme Court remanded
the case for further findings because the Court remained concerned that
these private decisions may have been tainted by public actions
maintaining a de jure segregated school system. 4 The court of appeals
had seen the record so differently that it had ordered consideration of
drastic remedies. 5 These remedies, it admitted, would require school
district actions that "may be administratively awkward, inconvenient,

7. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 1438-41 (1992) [hereinafter Freeman].
8. See id. at 1445.
9. Id. at 1441-42.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
11. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. at 1455 (opinion of Blackmnn, J., Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1447.
14. Id. at 1447-50.
15. Id. at 1442 (citing Pitts
v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1448 (11th Cir. 1989)).
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Pragmatism in School Desegregation
and even bizarre in some situations. 1 6 This rhetoric-which the
Supreme Court rejected 1 -conjured up depressing memories of black
and white children transported long distances from nearby schools,
against resistance by worried parents.
The Freeman decision thus prompts a hard look at the entire history of
school desegregation remedies in America. That retrospective is the
purpose of this essay. For selected issues, this analysis travels the road
from Brown to Freeman and back again. It begins where desegregation
remedies themselves began, with the second decision in Brown v. Board
8 with its concept of "all deliberate speed"
of Education,"
that contrasted
so sharply with the Court's later insistence on "a plan that promises...
to work now" in Green v. County School Board9 and its authorization of
large-scale satellite busing in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of
Education.20 The author's conclusion is that Brown ll, unlike Brown I,21
was a poorly conceived decision because although it bent over
backwards to seem pragmatically workable, it was not sufficiently
anchored in comprehensible principles. 2 It led inevitably to an era of
judicially-imposed plans that perhaps reflected the best the Court could
do with what it had created-but the defects in the decisions of this era
defeated much of the purpose.'
Next, this essay considers the Court's decisions in Keyes v. School
District No. 1, 24 Columbus Board of Education v. Peniclk' and Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman,2 6 which established "presumptions"
about the extent of constitutional violations and about causation. Here,
the author's conclusion is that these controversial rules, although clear
and principled, were in some respects so unfair and lacking in
pragmatism, and engendered such disrespect, that they cost more than

16. Id. (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971)).
17. Id. at 1447-49 (stating that the court of appeals was "mistaken"; "[t]he law is not so
formalistic"; calling for a "feasible" remedy instead).
18. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
19. 391 U.S. 430,439 (1968).
20. 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971) [hereinafter Swann].
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra part I.
See infra part II.
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
443 U.S. 449 (1979) [hereinafter Columbus].
443 U.S. 526 (1979) [hereinafter Dayton 11].

Washington Law Review

Vol 68:753, 1993

they remedied in the long run.27 They reflected, in other words, the
opposite defect from that exhibited in Brown I.
Then, the essay considers the decisions on termination of court
supervision: Spangler, Dowell, and Freeman. These cases depend
heavily on questions of causation-that is, on whether racial variations in
schools are legally attributable to discriminatory decisions by public
officials or to migration decisions by private individuals." In its hardest
form, such a question resembles an inquiry about whether eggs "cause"
chickens, or perhaps more aptly, whether exposure to a single novel
factor among the myriad in the universe has "caused" a particular case of
cancer in an identifiable individual.29 "Cause" is such an indefinite
concept that scientists tend to avoid it.30 It often disguises a leap of logic
to the policy conclusion ordained by the decision maker's social values."
Yet the courts cannot avoid such inquiries, and actually, the terminationof-supervision decisions combine principle and pragmatism in a way that
is more satisfying than many other decisions along the road from Brown
to Freeman.3 2 But then, perhaps this is faint praise: one might expect
that it would be easier to make the decision whether to continue

27. See infra part IlI.
28. See infra part IV(B).
29. See generally Marvin Legator, Toxicology, Part One: An Overview of the Discipline, in
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE FOR LAWYERS,
A-1 to A-13 (David Crump & Sanford Gaines eds., 1992) (discussing difficulty of inferring
causation from alleged carcinogens from experimental or epidemiological data).
30. Instead, scientists generally describe the concept in terms of the "association" of two events,
or their "correlation," without identifying either one (or a third event) as the cause of the other. For
example, Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992) (citing Franklin D. Wilon & Karl E. Tacuber,
Residential and School Segregation: Some Tests of Their Association, in THE DEMOGRAPHY OF
RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 51, 57-58 (Franklin D. Bean & W. Parker Frisbie eds., 1978)),
describes scientific literature showing a "high correlation" between residential segregation and
school segregation. This correlation between observations of residential segregation and school
segregation can be definitively measured (such as by a chi-square test, which determines the
statistical significance of the correlation, or in other words the improbability of its random
occurrence). The correlation can be compared to other correlations by this measure. Inferences of
"causation," however, cannot be similarly measured or compared except on a totality-of-thecircumstances judgment-which is to say that they cannot be subjected to the comparison or
repeatability tests that are essential to science.
31. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 7
(5th ed. 1984) (dealing with proximate causation, cause-in-fact, and policy considerations that
underlie them).
32. See infra part IV(C).

Pragmatism in School Desegregation
supervision of a complex equitable remed 3 than to create it in the first
place34 or to enforce it against resistance."
Why study these questions? The problems of school desegregation
that our country struggled with from 1954 to 1992 are unlikely to repeat
themselves in the twenty-first century, at least not in exactly the same
way. The answer, of course, is that although the precise problems of the
post-Brown era may not recur, the courts have faced and will continue to
face other situations calling for unpopular and difficult institutional
remedies.36 One hopes that painful lessons, once learned, can be used to
lessen the pain in analogous circumstances.
After looking from Brown to Freeman and back again, one learns at
least two things about equitable remedies for complex constitutional
violations. First, these remedies must be pragmatic.37 They must take
adequate account of human institutions and their failings. The second
lesson, however, is that such remedies must also be principled." They
must not express excessive tolerance for human failings, lest they
encourage them.
The trouble is, the second lesson contradicts the first. And so the
courts in these kinds of cases always will resemble the navigator between
Scylla and Charybdis. To be principled without pragmatism is to justify
resistance and rebellion, because people subject to the decree rightly will
recognize as intolerable the injustices that inevitably flow from antidemocratic inflexibility. On the other hand, to be pragmatic without
principle is to invite contemptuous noncompliance, as those subject to
the decree recognize that a lack of protection for minority rights
encourages the majority to ignore them. Perhaps this dilemma is the
origin of the two contradictory currents that one sees in the Freeman
opinions. At times the courts in desegregation cases have foundered on
one side of these rocky shores, and at times on the other.39

33. See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430.
34. See Brown I, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
35. See, eg., Swann, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Dayton 1, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
36. For example, the federal courts have decided numerous cases involving allegations of
unconstitutional conditions in prisons, and many of these cases include institutional supervision by
retention of jurisdiction over many years. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex.
1980); rev'd inpart,679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
37. See, e.g., infra part WV(C).
38. See, e.g., infra part 1V(C).
39. Compare, e.g., infra part I with infra part II.
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I.

BROJWN11: THE LONG JOURNEY BEGINS

A.

Brown II Contrastedto Brown I: Not with a Bang, but a Whimper

After its bold and definitive opinion in Brown I, the Supreme Court
did not remand promptly, as it usually does. Instead, it ordered new
briefs and arguments." The result was a new controversy that took
another year to decide. The Court carved out a related question and
made it distinct: now that the Court had found that many of the nation's
public schools were unconstitutionally segregated, what should the Court
do about it?41 The answer, in Brown IT, was a decision whose mushiness
was as disappointing as the solidity of Brown Iwas satisfying.
The Brown I1 Court emphasized, "[I]t should go without saying that
the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield
simply because of disagreement with them."'42 But the rest of the opinion
reads as though the Court was intimidated by precisely that
disagreement. It is easy to see why. The judiciary, as Alexander
Hamilton wrote, is the "least dangerous" branch of government.43 "The
judiciary... has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can
take no active resolution whatever." The Court had gone out on a limb
in the first place by its overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson,45 which had
been repeatedly reacknowledged for sixty years46 and was firmly
ingrained in many parts of the nation's social structure-however wrong
it may have been. The judgment to overrule Plessy was one thing. Its
enforcement was another.
It is difficult to imagine the conditions of resistance that the Court
faced from some quarters, or the intimidating effect that these conditions
must have had. Some slight appreciation of those effects can be gained
from a reading of Cooper v. Aaron.4 7 The people of Arkansas actually
amended their state constitution to direct the Arkansas legislature to
40. Brown Z 347 U.S. 483,495-96 (1954).
41. Id.
42. Brown I, 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955).
43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
44. Id.
45. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
47. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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oppose "in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional
48
desegregation decisions . . . of the United States Supreme Court."
Arkansas even set up a sovereignty commission for that purpose.4 9 The
day before the opening of Central High School in Little Rock, the
governor of Arkansas dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to
enforce "the law"; this meant, however, enforcing the pre-Brown "law"
that permitted segregation."
The national guard actually placed the
school off-limits to black students." Thereafter, at the request of the
Little Rock School Board, the federal district court charged with
implementing the Brown decrees granted a two-and-one-half year
suspension of the school board's court-approved desegregation
program. 2 In response to this effort by Arkansas to resurrect the theories
of interposition and nullification, the Supreme Court found it necessary
to address the most elementary propositions of constitutional law.
"Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the 'supreme Law
of the Land,"' the Cooper v. Aaron Court wrote.5 3 "It follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land...."'
Ultimately, President Eisenhower ordered troops under the authority
of the United States to carry out the enforcement of desegregation orders
in Arkansas. 5 The point, however, is that the justices of the Supreme
Court could not have held absolute confidence that this would be the
outcome. To quote Alexander Hamilton again, the courts "have neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of [their]
judgments."5' 6 What if the president, acting within his authority as
commander-in-chief5 7 and arguably performing his constitutional duty,
had declined to enforce the Court's decree on the ground that the
commitment of troops would be militarily unsound, or that it would
likely result in a high number of civilian casualties, or even that the
resulting deprivation of political freedom to the Arkansas voting majority
48. Id at 8-9.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 18.

54. Id.
55. DAvID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (1989).
56. THE FEDERALIST No.78, supra note 43, at 227.

57. U.S. CONST. art. If.
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The result would have been a
would be counterproductive?5 8
Scot 9 decision. Undoubtedly that
the
Dred
constitutional crisis to rival
is why the justices, in Cooper v. Aaron,' took the unprecedented step of
signing all nine of their names to the opinion of the Court, rather than
assigning one justice to draft it.
The Brown -I opinion is full of responses to anticipated pressures of
this kind, notwithstanding its disclaimer of intimidation. In the first
place, the Court authorized no specific kind of remedy, because, as it put
the matter, implementation "may require [a] solution of varied local
school problems."6 1 For this reason, the Court placed upon local
"[s]chool authorities" the "primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these problems."'62 The counterintuitive notion of
leaving it to the defendants to fashion relief to remedy their own
violations of law was reinforced by the conclusion that the lower courts
"will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes
good faith implementation."'63
The main consideration that was to go into the fashioning of any
resulting court decrees was that the lower courts "will be guided by
The next sentence, however accurate as a
equitable principles."'
65
historical statement, embodied the timidity of the entire decision:
"Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public
and private needs. 66 This indeterminate balancing of interests obviously
would go far to mollify the "disagreement" (that is, resistance) that the
Court denounced but clearly expected; it also would make enforcement
less practical, and disobedience more probable, by its very uncertainty.
In fact, since Brown IInever defined what it meant by "full compliance"
with the Constitution, these soothing words did more than weaken the

58. Cf.CRUMP ET AL., supranote 55, at 49-50 (discussing factors that might have constrained the
president).
59. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
60. 358 U.S. 1,4 (1958).
61. Brown 1, 349 U.S. 294,299 (1955).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 300.
65. See DAVID CRUMP T AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.03 (2d ed.
1992).

66. BrownII, 349 U.S. at 300 (1955).

Pragmatism in School Desegregation
remedy; they undermined the right that had been declared in such ringing
language in Brown 1.67
The rest of the Court's rhetoric explained this principle of
indeterminate balancing. All that was required in the short run was that
"the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start."" "Once such a
start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary
to carry out the ruling in an effective manner."69 The courts could
consider problems related to various aspects of the school system, from
administration to revision of local laws and regulations. 0 The core of
this responsibility was that the courts "will also consider the adequacy of
any plans that the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to
effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. 7 1
But as for the targeted level of "adequacy" of these "plans," the opinion
was monumentally non-specific. It ended with instructions to the lower
courts to enter "such orders and decrees" as would be necessary to admit
students on a racially nondiscriminatory basis, "with all deliberate
72
speed."
Thus did the decision that began with a bang in Brown I end with a
whimper in Brown 1. The denunciation of resistance, apparently, was so
much whistling in the dark. Having stuck its neck out, the Court
partially withdrew it, which was the worst thing the Court could have
done short of retreat. In fact, the Freeman majority implicitly admits the
Court's mistake thirty-seven years later, by saying that "Interpreting 'all
deliberate speed' as giving latitude to delay," was an "all too familiar
[response]" to Brown H.73 Thus, with the benefit of historical hindsight,
the observer from the vantage point provided by Freeman can see that
several problems were predictable, indeed inevitable, results of the timid
and confusing opinion in Brown I.

67. E.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (reasoning that separation on racial grounds
generates stigma that diminishes motivation to learn; concluding that separate but equal "is not

equal').
68. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id. at301.
72. Id.
73. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1436 (1992).
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PragmaticFlexibility Without Principle:FourDefects in Brown II

In the first place, the Court had put the defendants in charge of the
remedy.74 Usually, courts do not place the fox in charge of bringing the
hen house into compliance with law. Perhaps some justification for this
aspect of the decision can be found in that the defendants' officials all
were public servants, subject to oaths to uphold the Constitution, and
after all, they best would know how to achieve the desired result with the
least interference with other objectives.7 Nevertheless, this aspect of the
decision (backed up by potential court supervision, but with no mandate
as to remedy or result) was far from "traditional,"'76 even under principles

of equity.
At the same time, the Supreme Court's approach disadvantaged the
honest politician who sincerely desired to achieve compliance, while
rewarding the unscrupulous one. If elected public officials must enforce
an unpopular decision, let it at least be clear what they are required to do.
That way, they can point to written rules that they are required to follow,
and they can call upon the population to conform to the rule of law. At
the very least, they can blame it all upon the court-while doing what
they are supposed to do.77
Instead, the Supreme Court in Brown II left the honest public servant
twisting slowly in the wind. Especially in issuing to elected officials
orders that contradict the majority vote, a court should bear in mind that
these officials remain accountable to the democracy for all of their
actions, including those effectuating compliance with the Constitution.7"
74. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text
75. Thus, by minimizing the interference with other legitimate objectives such as fiscal integrity,
educational excellence, and proximity to extracurricular activities, this approach arguably carried out
the flexible balancing that is characteristic of equity. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
76. Historically, most equitable remedies have involved a defined performance by the defendant
rather than an obligation upon the defendant to generate plans by which to achieve the objective of
compliance, although modem institutional litigation tends to depart from the historical pattern. Cf.
CRUMP E AL., supranote 65 §§ 14.03-.04.
77. The Supreme Court made this point in its 1992 abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2815-16 (1992). There, the Court's conclusion (paraphrased) was that if the
Court muddled the law by overruling a decision that the people had followed despite strong contrary
emotions, it would be acting particularly unfairly toward those who had overcome disagreement with
the law in order to follow it. In that context-the overruling of a past decision-the point is
controversial because it is vulnerable to the argument that the decision should nevertheless be
overruled if it is incorrect. n the present context, however, the point more clearly is valid: An
unpopular decision is harder for elected officials to get people to follow if it is muddled.
78. Cf.Freeman, 112 S. Ct 1430, 1445 (1992) (stating: "When school (officials] .. .make
").
decisions in the absence ofjudicial supervision, they can be held accountable to the citizenry ....
This accountability is desirable unless the courts have determined that its result is unconstitutional,
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The pragmatism of the Brown I1decision, however, concealed a lack of
principle that placed the conscientious public official with the choice
between following the law or accommodating majority preferences,
without even a fig leaf of protection if he chose the former. Thus, Brown
H contained the seeds of its own destruction because its effectuation
depended upon the willingness of elected officials to commit political
suicide.
The second problem with Brown / was that it did not tell district
judges what they were to do if the defendants did not remedy official
segregation. The Court referred to numerous factors that a district judge
should "consider," including "the adequacy of any plans the defendant
may propose."79 The Supreme Court's willingness to downplay the
difficulty of the task is shown by its statement of the reason for this
formless remand: "Because of their proximity to local conditions and the
possible need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard
these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal."' Thus did hopeful
phraseology keep the justices from describing more than a "possible"'"
need for further hearings on this cataclysmic issue. And instead of
imposing remedies with a hard edge to them, the judges would perform
only an "appraisal" of school districts' plans. As for the "district judges'
proximity to local conditions," although that might be a blessing in some
cases, in this situation it also was a curse. The district judges were a part
of the community for which they were to order this counter-democratic
remedy, and indeed almost by definition they were part of the
majoritarian body politic that had produced the unconstitutional
conditions in the first place.'
They thus shared some of the
characteristics of elected school trustees. The judges too needed the fig
leaf of a principled basis for their unpopular orders.83
Instead of a remedy governed by principles, however, the district
judges were required to "consider the adequacy of . . . plans" for

in which event intervention that leaves the same accountability in place cannot be expected to
remedy the unconstitutional condition.
79. See supranotes 70-71 and accompanying text.
80. Brown RI, 349 U.S. 294,299 (1955).
81. See id.
82. By definition, they all were nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, after
recommendation by the senior senators of the president's political party from their respective states.
The process of their appointments thus assured majoritarian input.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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desegregation devised by the defendants. 4 This concept not only was
poorly defined, it also fit poorly with the judicial competence.
Legislatures perhaps can be expected to get from point A to point B by
tacking and weaving, and reacting in a time sequence with shifting
approaches-but courts, whose expertise is in sticking to principles once
decided, could be expected to be less adept at finding the path." Worse
yet, the Supreme Court tempered even this amorphcus charge with an
invitation for delay: "The burden rests upon the defendants to establish
that [additional] time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent
with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. '8 6 All that
was required immediately was "a prompt and reasonable start," followed
by a "period of transition" during which "the courts will retain
jurisdiction."" Instead of issuing a writ of execution or an injunction
enforceable by contempt, the district judges were required to wrestle
with a tar baby.
Third, the Court's decision did not require anything to be done now,
or even in the near future. An incidental, and yet important, aspect of the
Brown II opinion is that the Court's remedial order provided no
meaningful relief to the winning plaintiffs before it.88 The famous phrase
that the Court used to describe the agenda---"all deliberate speed"--was
itself a grandiloquent oxymoron. The requirement of compliance
expressed in such phrases as "prompt" and "earliest practicable date"
was contradicted by authorizations of "additional time" and the emphasis
of a "deliberate" pace.89 When the result was to happen was left as
confused as what the result was to be.
Finally, the Court's very vacillation was itself an invitation to
defiance. Even the condemnation of disagreement as an excuse for
noncompliance seemed to invite noncompliance." It may be that the
Court correctly perceived that resistance was inevitable and that its
84. Brown I1, 349 U.S. at 300; see supratext accompanying note 71.
85. This principle underlies many of the Court's doctrines for deference to the legislative branch,
including the political question doctrine, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); the current
commerce power jurisprudence, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981); and the rational basis test, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
86. Brown I1, 349 U.S. at 300.
87. Id. at 301; see supratext accompanying note 68.
88. They would get no relief unless their districts voluntarily complied or unless the lower courts
supervising their districts entered further orders requiring compliance-and did so before the
plaintiffs graduated.
89. See Brown 1I, 349 U.S. at 300-01; see also supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
90. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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ability to carry out its decree was in doubt.91 That circumstance,
however, should have prompted the court to act with firmness rather than
vacillation.92 There exists, of course, the possibility that the Court would
have been unable to muster a firm consensus, or perhaps even a majority,
in favor of specific and hard-edged remedies; in any event, fairness to the
Court compels the admission that these criticisms are more easily made
from a vantage point forty years removed.
The results of these flaws in Brown Ii were not long in coming. In
1958, the Court found it necessary to issue its strange opinion in Cooper
v. Aaron.93 Although the defiance was immediate, it did not immediately
dissipate. So-called freedom of choice plans allowed free transfers by
students. In Goss v. Board of Education,94 the Court found it necessary
to decide that minority-to-majority transfers could not be permitted under
such a plan because they tended to perpetuate segregation. In Rogers v.
Paul,95 the school district had adopted a grade-a-year plan, which meant
that upper grades remained segregated by law, and the Court reversed a
lower court decision rejecting a challenge to this plan and indicated that
delays no longer were tolerable. Finally, in Griffin v. County School
Board,96 the Court found itself required to hold that the closing of the
public schools wholesale in a given county was a denial of equal
protection to black students.
C.

What Should Have Been Done Instead?:A View of Brown llfrom
the PerspectiveofFreeman

What should the Court have done instead? One suggestion that has
been offered, particularly by the provocative work of Professor Graglia,
is that the Court could and should have required assignment of children
on a nonracial basis to their neighborhood schools.97 The Court could

91. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
92. Cf note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that all nine justices in Cooper v.
Aaron signed the opinion to communicate firmness in a climate in which enforcement otherwise was
doubtfiul).
93. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see supranotes 47-54 and accompanying text.
94. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
95. 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
96. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
97. LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 33-45 (1976). See also Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting' the Constitution: Posner on
Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1037-43 (1992) (justifying Brown in originalist theory).

Washington Law Review

Vol 68:753, 1993

have set out such a requirement as a matter of unambiguous principle.9"
Elected officials could have invoked acceptance of the rule of law in
implementing it, because it would have been clear that they had no room
to bend the requirements even in deference to majoritarian sentiments. 9
Thus, they could have "blamed the Court" if they needed to, while doing
their duty.
The neighborhood school remedy also would not have required the
development of complex "plans" that extended judges beyond the
judicial competence." This remedy could have been carried out so as to
have granted relief promptly to existing plaintiffs as well as to future
students."0 ' Presumably, it could have been implemented for the coming
school year in the vast majority of districts. In fact, many school districts
in which resistance was lower achieved substantial desegregation in the
first year after Brown II by using precisely this method. 2 Finally, such
a plan could have been put forth without intern.1 contradiction or
vacillation. I13
The opposing view, supported by many other commentators, is that
neighborhood school assignment is insufficient.1"' After all, it would fail
to remedy instances of school segregation resulting from residential
housing patterns. These commentators reason that private housing
decisions presumably were affected at least to some extent by existing
segregation in the schools or other official actions affecting housing or
transportation. This housing-induced segregation, they argue, is to that
extent de jure and unconstitutional. 05 This argument is substantial. In

98. In other words, the Court could have simply required assignment to the school that was the
shortest distance from the child's residence. The rule could not be quite so unambiguous, because it
would require exceptions for hardship cases and special needs, and it would be important to limit
these exceptions so that they did not swallow the rule; but this endeavor would resemble the
traditional role of the courts.
99. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
102. For example, the DeKalb district accomplished substantial desegregation by a neighborhood
plan when faced with the implementation of Green. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1436-37 (1992).
103. See supra notes 42-54, 90-91 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, School Desegregationin the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing?,
95 YALE L.J. 1737 (1986) (discussing the need to remedy the results, in schools, of segregation in
housing).
105. See id.
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fact, the opinions in Freemanvalidate the view that neighborhood school
assignments alone may not be enough. 106
Perhaps the assignment of students to neighborhood schools could
have been ordered with the understanding that it was only a first step,
with further remedies to include dismantling of other manifestations of
the dual system. For example, the courts could (as they ultimately did)
enjoin new construction that would maximize segregation, and in
necessary cases it could pair or cluster schools or even engage in the
more drastic remedies that the Court later authorized.0 7 The point is that
there were principled alternatives to the mushiness of Brown I, and
irrespective of whether they were sufficient, irrespective of whether the
Court should have gone further, it is unfortunate that it did not order
them. Neighborhood schools would not have worked everywhere, and
they would not have done the whole job in other locations; this
reasoning, however, is not an argument against their use as a beginning.
The Freeman opinion supports these conclusions. When the DeKalb
County School System finally got down to business after the "do-it-now"
mandate of Green, its principal remedy was an agreed order that
"abolished the freedom of choice plan and adopted a neighborhood
school attendance plan. .. ."08 That single change apparently was the
backbone of a transformation to pupil assignments that "impressed" the
district court with the system's "successes," improved the quality of
education for African-American children, and led to a finding of unitary
status at least for student distribution."0 9
Of course, that neighborhood plan was not all of the remedy. DeKalb
also closed all of its former de jure black schools, and it instituted a
number of other programs that could be expected to counteract the effect
of segregation in housing patterns, most notably majority-to-minority
transfers and magnet schools."0 In any event, a look back from the
vantage point of Freeman justifies both the supporters of neighborhood
106. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1438-40 (majority opinion by Justice Kennedy); see id. at 1454
(concurring opinion of Justice Souter); id.at 1549 (concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun). See
also Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971) (stating, "People gravitate toward school facilities, just as
schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools thus may influence
the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on
composition of inner-city neighborhoods.").
107. See infra part III (discussing Columbus, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton II,443 U.S. 526
(1979); Swann, 402 U.S. 1).
108. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. at 1436.
109. Id. at 1437.
110. Id. at 1440.
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school plans and their critics: it may well be that additional remedies
would have been necessary because of de jure effects upon housing
segregation, but the Court in Brown H should have started with a
principled decree rather than with mushy pragmatism-and it could have
done so by requiring neighborhood school assignment as an immediate
beginning even if it did not end there.
The author's own experience while growing up in the Houston
Independent School District and attending Lamar High School furnishes
a particularly compelling example. Lamar High School then served the
River Oaks area, among others; in fact, it is located at the intersection of
River Oaks Boulevard and Westheimer Road. At that time, there also
was an area in which African-Americans resided within a few short
blocks of the school. My home was more distant, and I often traveled
past this black area on the way to school. Under the regime of that era,
however, not a single African-American child attended Lamar; the
school was still all white at the time of my graduation in 1962, eight
years after Brown I.
This unfortunate (and illegal) state of affairs would have ended shortly
after Brown II if the Supreme Court, then and there, had ordered
neighborhood schools as a first step. It is probably also true that more
would have been necessary in Houston to prevent future acts of official
segregation and to address housing discrimination, but some degree of
timely relief could at least have been obtained. In concrete terms, the
African-American children whose homes I passed on the way to school
would no longer have suffered from their discriminatory school
assignments, which presumably were accomplished by sending them
longer distances to all-black schools. And the members of the all-white
Lamar class of 1962, including the author, would likewise have been
spared the less immediately apparent but nevertheless obviously harmful
effects of their own segregated-and therefore inferior-educations.
II.

GREEN, ALEXANDER, AND SWANN: THE ERA OF COURTIMPOSED DESEGREGATION PLANS

A.

The Falloutfrom Brown: Desegregation "Now"

In 1968, thirteen years after Brown I1, the Supreme Court obviously
was frustrated by the conditions it confronted in Green v. County School
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Board."' In one sense, the frustration was justified. The district court in
Green had found that "[t]he School Board operates one white combined
elementary and high school... and one negro combined elementary and
high school ....There are no attendance zones. Each school serves the
entire county."'1 2 School buses traveled overlapping routes throughout
the county to serve a school district whose schools were perfectly
segregated."1 Factually, Green was Brown all over again. The freedomof-choice plan adopted by the school district had caused no change from
the unconstitutional conditions that had existed under Plessy v.
Ferguson. As the Court put it, "The pattern of separate 'white' and
'[n]egro' schools in the New Kent County school system.., is precisely
the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown 11 were
particularly addressed.... "114
But in another sense, the Court's frustration was unwarranted because
it had itself as well as school officials to blame. The sorry record of the
New Kent County School Board was a consequence of political
effectuation of majoritarian preferences that were carried out precisely
because the Court in Brown I had failed to order a remedy with any
timetable, any method, any principle, or any defined result. Now, really
for the first time, the Court was ready to say what it meant in Brown 11:
the "thrust" of that decision "was a call for the dismantling of wellentrenched dual systems.'. 5 In other words, school districts with de jure
segregation at the time of Brown I had not merely an obligation to cease
unconstitutional operations, but also an "affirmative duty" to
desegregate." 6 Furthermore, the Court had a new timetable: "The time
for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out .... The burden on a school
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now."'" 7 Finally, the Court was
ready to specify more drastic methods: the school board must be required
to formulate a new plan and, "in light of other courses which appear open
to the [b]oard, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically

111. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) [hereinafter Green].
112. Id. at432.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 435.
115. Id. at437.
116. Id. at 437-38.
117. Id. at 438-39 (emphasis added).
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to convert promptly to a' 18system without a 'white' school and a 'negro'
school, but just schools."
A year later, the Court reconsidered these questions. In Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education,"9 it held that "every school district
is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and
hereafter only unitary schools."' 20 There was an increasing urgency to
the Court's rhetoric, but the decision in Alexander also reflected a
substantive tightening of the requirement. Deliberate speed, or even "a
plan that promises to work now," was no longer enough; instead, the
requirement was termination of dual schools "at once" and immediate
commencement of operation of only "unitary" schools.
Unfortunately, even this statement was inadequate, and in Swann' a
unanimous Court made Brown II concrete by affirming drastic remedies.
In the process, if the Court did not "draw pictures" for resistant districts
and restrained district courts, it at least gave illustrations and drew lines.
The Swann opinion established four basic principles. First, it upheld a
"racial balance requirement . . . on individual schools," at least when
such a mathematical ratio "was no more than a starting point ...rather
than an inflexible requirement."' 22 Second, the Court held that "onerace" schools (defined as a school whose students were all or
"predominantly" of one race, even if in a part of the city where "minority
groups are . . . found concentrated") triggered a heightened level of
scrutiny that the school board could satisfy only by carrying the burden
of demonstrating "that their racial composition is not the result of present
or past discriminatory action on their part."'"
Third, the Swann opinion authorized the district courts to alter
attendance zones as a remedy. The Supreme Court had approved this
concept in earlier cases (for example, Green), 24 but in Swann the Court
took it farther: the Court approved "a frank-and sometimes
drastic-gerrymandering of... attendance zones," as well as "pairing,
'clustering,' or 'grouping' of schools with attendance assignments made
deliberately to accomplish the transfer" of African-American students

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 442.
396U.S. 19 (1969).
Id. at 20.
402 U.S. 1 (1971).

122. Id. at 22-25.
123. Id. at 26-27.
124. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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out of segregated schools and white students into them.12
More
importantly, the Court approved what opponents would denounce as
massive cross town busing. "More often than not," the Court wrote,
"these zones are neither compact nor contiguous; indeed they may be on
opposite ends of the city"-but "this cannot be said to be beyond the
broad remedial powers of a court" as an "interim corrective measure." 26
Fourth and finally, the limits of remedies involving transportation were
reached when the time or distance of travel was so great "as to either risk
the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational
process."' 27
The decisions in Green, Alexander, and Swann were the result of the
weaknesses in Brown I." As acknowledgments of the rule of law, they
were preferable to that decision. Rather than invite defiance by
accommodation, these decisions instead straightforwardly ordered
compliance with the law.'29 At the same time, however, these decisions
produced unfortunate, and in some respects ironic, results.
B.

The Defects in Green, Alexander, and Swam

One defect that persisted through Swann was that the Court still did
not understand the political position of school board officials. It
bemoaned the fact that "the school board had totally defaulted in its
acknowledged duty to come forward with an acceptable plan of its own"
on at least three occasions.13 ° Because of this "total failure of the school
board," the Supreme Court wrote that the district court was obliged "to
do what the board should have done."'' This rhetoric indicates that the
Court still was not able or willing to see its mistake in Brown II. The
Court should have expected that its earlier mushiness would produce this
inaction on the theory that the desired result would not be achieved if it
depended primarily upon the willingness of elected officials to
countermand the strongly felt wishes of a majority of the electorate.'
Such an approach would only encourage democratic (if illegal) resistance

125. Swann, 402 U.S. at 27-29.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at29-31.
See suprapart 1(B).
Cf suprapart 1(3) (discussing vacillation in Brown II).
Swann, 402 U.S. at 24.
Id.
See supranotes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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by the majority of the voting public, place elected public officials in the
untenable position of choosing between majoritarian sentiments or
adherence to principles of law that at best were unclear, and place district
judges in the untenable position of negotiating with the elected officials
in an atmosphere of inflamed public sentiment. 33 In summary, the need
for a court-ordered plan based upon elected officials' default in Swann
was a predictable result of the fallout from Brown ff.
Moreover, these decrees were not merely anti-democratic or
destructive of important private interests. A second flaw is that they
were discriminatory, at least in their results. The Swann opinion
obviously contemplated busing African-American children long
distances to attend majority-white schools."3 A larger percentage of
these children inevitably would be bused, and to desegregate the most
difficult all-white schools they would have to be bused greater distances
"'
than whites, who could be moved from nearer locations. 35
But if an
African-American child was ordered bused forty-five minutes per day
each way to attend a school that white children attended in their
neighborhood, could it be said that the black child had been afforded
equal protection of the laws?'3 6 Such a result could occur from
nondiscriminatory motives: the fact that whites were overall in the
majority simply meant that a smaller percentage would be bused, and for
lesser distances. Doctrinally, perhaps that result could be defended on
the theory that it did not reflect purposeful or intentional discrimination
against the African-American child but only the disparate impact of a
systemwide plan.
In other words, one might reason that the
discriminatory impact against the black child had resulted "in spite of"
and not "because of" the intent that motivated the government conduct.
Such decisions as PersonnelAdministratorof Massachusettsv. Feeney'37

133. See supra part I(B) (discussing defects in Brown II).
134. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
135. This consequence flowed from the Court's focus on one-race schools, coupled with the
minority status of African-American children.
136. The busing times for children in Swann were shorter, see 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971);
however, since the limits on bus trips were defined only by health and educational concerns, id.,
there was no assurance in Swann that trips would always or even typically be so short.
137. 429 U.S. 66 (1976) (holding that a state's hiring preference, afforded to veterans, was not
unconstitutional merely on account of disparate impact in which overwhelmingly more males were
helped than females where the policy was not the result of intentional discrimination and was
adopted in spite of, and not because of, the disparate impact).

772
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and McCleskey v. Kemp13 would uphold the result. But even if this
analysis could answer the criticism doctrinally, it could not eliminate the
undesirable effects of this solution.
A third and deeper problem arose from this discriminatory impact. Is
the concern of the equal protection clause that each individual shall be
treated with equality before the law, or that major classes of people shall
be treated without class discrimination?. 139 If the concern is limited to
remedying discrimination against a group or class, adverse impacts upon
some individuals within the class may be the unavoidable result. This
effect is shown by the example of the bused African-American child.
Which model, then-that of individual or group-most accurately
reflects the purpose of the equal protection clause? Perhaps it is possible
to make a synthesis: elimination of group or class discrimination can be
carried out so long as it does not have excessive effects on individuals.
Perhaps, in other words, it can be argued that the elimination of effects
from illegal segregation is a value that is likely to enhance the interests
of all individuals and, therefore, although equal treatment of individuals
is a primary focus of the equal protection clause, it cannot be achieved
without recognition of group rights. Even if this theory is true, however,
it still did not eliminate the discriminatory impact upon individuals, or
the public perception that the law was unequally applied. The distinction
between action that avoids ill effects on classes, and action that avoids
harm to individuals within those classes, is of a scope that is beyond this
article; in any event, even if a philosophical accommodation of the
tension can be reached, it may not prevent resistance by individuals
harmed in the purpose of protecting classes. And if the resistance is
sufficient, it may frustrate the ultimate purpose.
These issues were related to a fourth defect in the Green-AlexanderSwann line of cases: they failed to define the three distinct concepts of
nonsegregation, desegregation, and integration.' In fact, these decisions
blurred the distinctions. At the time of Brown I, some observers may
have thought that the elimination of segregative practices was enough. 14 '
138. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that differential racial impacts in the criminal justice system
did not render sentencing unconstitutional because the impacts were not intentional and occurred in
spite of official policy, not because of it).
139. The justices of the Supreme Court have differed sharply over the individual-or-groupprotection issue. Cf Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J., emphasizes individual protection; opinion of Marshall. J., emphasizes group protection).
140. Cf supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
141. This impression could have arisen because Brown HI left undefined the compliance with the
Constitution that it required. See supranotes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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But Green introduced the "affirmative duty" to "desegregate," which
meant the elimination of all vestiges of de jure segregation."
Then,
Swann translated this concept of desegregation into a mathematical
"norm" of "racial balance."' 43 Even though the Court elsewhere
emphasized that the norm could be only a "starting point," that it "does
not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the
racial composition of the school system as a whole," and that if faced
with a judgment ordering "any particular degree of racial balance or
mixing . . . we would be obliged to reverse,"'" Swann blurred the
distinction between desegregation and integration.
And in a manner of speaking, it was the confusing nature of the
underlying concept that blurred the distinction, not the Court. The
45
requirement was not one of racial balance, at least not ultimately;'
instead, the real issue was one of remedies for past violations, by which
the Court had required all remnants of the dual school system eliminated
to the extent that it was practical to do so. 46 But the principal test of
desegregation was a "norm" of "racial balance," or integration. 7 "How
can we know the dancer from the dance?" asked William Butler Yeats. 4
The distinction between the measurement and the measure through
which it is perceived is easily confused. In short, the requirement was
desegregation, not integration, but the starting point for determining the
degree of desegregation was the degree of integration-and although this
fine distinction ultimately was logical to people who studied it carefully,
it was pragmatically difficult to maintain.
This difficulty raised the problem of intent and impact. The Court
continued to require proof of intent. Perhaps it could have fashioned a
different approach, one that focused ultimately upon how segregated the
schools were, rather than on how they got that way. Such an impactcentered approach would have required solutions to several difficulties,
including avoidance of mistreatment to individuals or school districts
who behaved lawfully and in good faith. Nevertheless, perhaps it could
have been done. Instead, the Court's confusion of intent and impact
142. See Green, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
143. See Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1971).
144. Id. at 24-25.
145. The Court even said that a requirement of "any particular degree of racial balance" would be
reversible error. Id. at 24.
146. Id. at 15-16.
147. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
148. William Butler Yeats, Among School Children, in HAZELTON SPENCER ET AL., BRInSH
LITERATURE: FRoM BLAKE To THE PREsENT DAY 905-06 (1952).
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created a regime in which the outcome could depend more upon the
predilections of the district judge-which president appointed him or
her-than upon the facts and law. Mushiness, in this context, created an
appearance of politics-rather-than-law, which was undesirable in a
situation so dependent upon majority-voter compliance.
Perhaps, after what it had done in Brown I and its progeny,14 9 the
Court had no choice. Thirteen years later, with a tradition of negotiations
between courts and schools firmly established,"' the Court could not go
back to what it should have done in that earlier line of cases. The
perspective of Freeman allows us, however, to see that the confusing
role given to norms of racial balance had pernicious effects.'
As the
Swann Court recognized, communities "will [not] remain
demographically stable," and school authorities are not required to
"make year-by-year adjustments."'5 As early as 1964, Alexander Bickel
had written that the "likely-and anticlimactic-outcome of all the
litigating and all the striving" after Brown was that "a number of [n]egro
children are admitted to white schools. Some few white children go to
[n]egro schools; most flee to other homes, or out of the public school
system altogether."'5 3 The Court was about to encounter a hydraulic
counterpressure, because the defects and ironies were not lost on
individual parents even if the Supreme Court could explain them with
confusing doctrine.

149. See supra notes 42-54,90-96 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 69, 72, 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the amorphous nature of a
district court's duty, goals, and timing, which led to intransigence and established the pattern here
described as negotiation).
151. Thus, for example, the Court found it necessary to explain that "unitary" status did not imply
any "fixed" meaning. See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992).
152. Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
153. Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation:Progress and Prospects, 64
COLum. L. Rgv. 193,214 (1964).
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III. KEYES, COLUMBUS, AND DAYTON: "PRESUIPTIONS" OF
CAUSATION
A.

Plaintiffs Obtain Powerful Tools: A Presumption ThatEven Very
LimitedProofofPre-BrownSegregation "Caused" Racial
Imbalances Years Later; The ForeseeableEffects Doctrine

One of the first cases outside the south to reach the Court was Keyes v.
School DistrictNo. 1,154 which involved the Denver school system. The
record contained proof of purposeful administrative action creating
segregation in a substantial portion of the school district. 55 The Court
reaffirmed its earlier statements that purposeful discrimination, and not
merely impact, was required. 56 However, it gave plaintiffs an important
tool for proving discriminatory purpose because it held that
discriminatory purpose in a substantial part of the district shifted to the
defendant the burden of disproving segregative intent in all other parts of
the district." 7 A major issue in the case concerned central city schools,
which were heavily black, but as to which little other evidence of
segregative purpose existed. 58
Thus, the effect of Keyes was not to retain the requirement of proof of
discriminatory purpose, but to create a presumption-the "Keyes
presumption"--that made it much easier to supply. The Court also
foreshadowed two other causation principles that were to surface again 1in
59
later decisions involving the Columbus and Dayton school systems.
Keyes thus became a significant weapon in school plaintiffs' arsenals.
Six years later, in Columbus,160 the Court took the Keyes decision a
step farther. There was no question that the public schools of Columbus,
Ohio, were highly segregated by race; half of them were more than 90
percent black or white. 61 The district court's findings of causation from
intentional official action had been affirmed by the court of appeals and
arguably supported the comprehensive and draconian decree that the
district court had entered (at least under the holdings of Green, Swann,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

413 U.S. 189 (1973) [hereinafter Keyes].
Id. at 206.
Seeid.at 207.
Id. at 208-11.
Id. at 191-95.
See infra notes 160-85 and accompanying text.
160. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
161. Id. at 452.
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and Keyes). 62 But the Supreme Court did not affirm on this basis alone.
It held that "actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact
63
are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose."'
Thus, although disparate results were not sufficient by themselves, and
discriminatory intent was required, disparate impact could supply proof
of discriminatory intent."6 The Court cited Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney, in which it had held that even a dramatically disparate impact
was insufficient if it resulted "in spite of" and not "because of" official

intentions. 165
Upon careful reading, the theoretical distinction emerges from
66
Columbus: the "foreseeable effects standard," as the Court called it,
could be used as some evidence of discrimination and in some cases
might furnish enough proof to support or even compel a finding of
purposeful discrimination, but it would not always support or compel
such a result. In real-life school systems, with long histories and with a
number of stubbornly persistent all-black schools, however, the
distinction was blurred. To put the matter bluntly, every school district
in the country had different distributions of black and white children.
Every one was overwhelmingly likely to have taken some action either
before or after Brown that could be argued to have altered this
distribution so as to increase racial concentration, whether officials were
aware of this consequence or not. In any event, if the effect was deemed
"foreseeable" in hindsight, it was evidence of purposeful discrimination.
Supporters could rightly point out that this "foreseeable effects" doctrine
supplied only some evidence of intent, and not absolute proof. When
carefully and theoretically examined, it could be squared with other
discrimination doctrines.' 67 On the other hand, detractors also could
argue that application to multiple decades of school district actions
enabled any motivated fact-finder to see discriminatory purpose
anywhere, as a sort of "heads I win, tails you lose" proposition. 6
162. Cf id. at 461 (predicating liability in part on finding that the school board "never actively set
out to dismantle [the] dual system").
163. Id. at 464.
164. This holding could be traced to earlier decisions, including Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886) (holding that disparate impact upon "subjects of China" was "so exclusive" that it
justified inference of discriminatory intent against them).
165. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 465 (citing Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)).
166. Id. at 464-65.
167. Such as those set out in Yick Wo and Feeney. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying
text.
168. This was the gist of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Columbus and Dayton II. See infra notes
183-84 and accompanying text.
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Then came Dayton 11.169 Fifty-one of the sixty-nine schools in the
Dayton system were virtually all white or all black. 170 In an earlier
decision known as Dayton I, the Court had remanded for a determination
of "how much incremental segregative effect [past] violations had [had]
on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently
constituted, when that distribution [was] compared to what it would have
This
been in the absence of such constitutional violations.''
determination would in turn determine the remedy, which "must be
designed to redress that difference."' 72 Faced with the requirement of
finding not just the amount of segregation but the "incremental
segregative effect" of certain factors as distinguished from others, the
district court dismissed the complaint." Not surprisingly, the court of
appeals reversed. 74
In affirming the reversal, the Supreme Court in Dayton II extended the
Keyes presumption and the Columbus foreseeable effects doctrine to
The Court reasoned that
recognize a broad presumption of causation.'
the initial constitutional requirement was that school officials operate
without intentional segregation.'76 Once that duty was violated by
intentional segregation, however, there arose an official duty-an
affirmative duty-to liquidate the dual system. 77 And the test of that
duty was the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions taken to
decrease or increase the segregation caused by the dual system. 78 Thus,
a failure to desegregate allowed the lower courts "to trace the current,
systemwide segregation back to the purposefully dual system of the
1950's and to [other] acts of intentional discrimination." 79 Since proof
of failure to desegregate was supplied by deviations from racial balance
such as one-race schools, this factor, together with proof of pre-Brown de
jure segregation, created the inference that existing imbalances were

169. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
170. Id. at 529-30.
171. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,420 (1977) [hereinafter Dayton 1].
172. Id.
173. Dayton IL 443 U.S. at 532.
174. Id. at 534.
175. Id. at 537. See Keyes, 413 U.S. 189, 208, 211 (1973); see also supra note 163 and
accompanying text (discussing the Columbus foreseeable effects standard).
176. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 534-36 (citing Brown 1).
177. Id. at 537-40.
178. Id. at 538. This principle traces to Green, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
179. Dayton 11443 U.S. at 541.
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connected to the pre-Brown regime. 18 Thus the logical effect of existing
principles, according to the Court, was a presumption of causation. 8 '
When school desegregation plaintiffs were able to demonstrate current
racial imbalances and past de jure segregation, the inference arose that
there was a causal "connection" between the two.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in all three cases, and he was joined in
Columbus and Dayton ff by Justice Powell. In Keyes, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the Court had gone beyond requiring disestablishment of
a genuinely dual system and had required consideration of race to
achieve "racial mixing" instead of mere desegregation.8 2 He criticized
both Columbus and Dayton H as "opinions so Delphic that lower courts
will be hard pressed to fathom their implications for school
desegregation litigation."' 83 Justice Rehnquist "could not subscribe to
the affirmative duty, the foreseeability test,
the cavalier treatment of
8I 4
rebuttal.'
of...
hope
false
the
and
causality,
B.

The Defect in Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton: PrincipleWithout
Pragmatism

The Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton decisions gave plaintiffs tools for
proof of liability, that is, for proof of violation and causation. More
importantly, a district court's handling of these presumptions determined
the shape of the remedy, because Dayton I called upon district judges to
determine the "incremental segregative effect [of] violations" and to
design remedies "to redress that difference."' 85
In short, Keyes,
Columbus, and Dayton II said as much about school desegregation
remedies as they did about proof of violations. Proof of presentimbalance-plus-past-violation not only sufficed to prove liability, it also
furnished justification for redrawing zone lines.
As inferences, the presumptions were defensible. That is to say, they
might rest upon evidence that, depending upon its strength and
combination with other evidence, could persuade a reasonable person of
intent or causation. 8 6 But in a practical world, Justice Rehnquist's
180. See id. at 537.
181. Id.
182. Keyes, 413 U.S. 189,254-65 (1973). Powell, J., dissented in part. Id. at 217-253.
183. Columbus, 443 U.S. 449,491 (1979).
184. Dayton 11,443 U.S. at 542.
185. Dayton 1 433 U.S. 406,420 (1977); see supranotes 171-72 and accompanying text.
186. See generally JOHN WILLIAM STRONG Er AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 580-82 (4th ed.
1992) (stating reasons for creation of presumptions). Whether the inference is strong enough to
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criticism of the Court's treatment of these inferences as "Delphic"' 8 7 was
understandable.
To see why, one might imagine a pre-Brown school board that
intentionally spent more funds per pupil on a virtually all-white suburban
school than on its black counterpart in the central city. Twenty years
later, soon after Dayton, and Columbus, a district judge might be faced
with the decision whether racial imbalances in a vastly larger and
differently shaped metropolitan area were now violations traceable to the
constitutional violation inherent in that deliberate but long-past act of
discriminatory funding. The truth is that the twenty years would be filled
with varied and disparate factors contributing to the circumstances.
These factors might or might not include other acts of official
segregation; community customs formed partly by official and partly by
private sources; influences of the media; job markets; private migration
patterns; cultural preferences in neighborhoods; and even parental
choices of out-migration or private education as a reaction to perceived
To trace the effects of
debasement of public school quality.
constitutional violations, one would need to separate them from neutral
or private actions. But the Keyes presumption, the Columbus foreseeable
effects doctrine, and the Dayton II presumption of causation combined to
focus the inquiry away from other factors.18 These decisions channeled
it instead into questions that emphasized evidence supporting both the
violation and the remedy by minimizing private and neutral factors.
For example, the hypothetical pre-Brown board's decision to fund
certain schools over others for discriminatory reasons was extended,
through the Keyes presumption, to the entire district. Although the shape
and size of the district may have been altered beyond recognition, Keyes
did not direct a district judge to take that factor into account.
Furthermore, differential funding certainly had the "foreseeable effect"
of perpetuating segregation. For that matter, if the school district had
adopted egalitarian funding patterns immediately after Brown, even that
neutral decision would have had the foreseeable effect of maintaining

justify a standardized rule shifting the burden of proof (which is what a presumption is), however, is
a more open question. This issue is made more doubtful by the difficulty of proving a negative,
which is the burden placed on the school district. See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1452 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
187. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 491 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
188. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
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segregation.' 9 For such a district, few actions short of racially remedial
assignment as in Swann would have passed the foreseeable effects
standard.1 90 Finally, Dayton 11 would connect all significant racial
imbalances existing twenty years later to the pre-Brown violations,
creating proof of causation. 9 '
These decisions would not have prevented a court from finding-as
indeed the Supreme Court did in Freeman'9 2 -that a given instance of
racial imbalance was not attributable to past acts of de jure segregation.
The school district would bear the burden of rebutting the presumption.
It could do so by affirmatively proving that the same racial distribution
would have occurred anyway owing to private migration. 93 But none of
the decisions told the district courts how to take such a consideration into
account, except for the defendant's hope of being able to rebut the
presumption. The result of this logic, then, was likely to be a finding of
systemwide discrimination traceable to constitutional violations,
requiring a commensurate-and therefore draconian--decree.' 94
Again, the Court's distinction between intent and impact was at the
heart of the concern. Again, it is possible that the Court could have
fashioned a test centered on impact, and that the Court could have
focused on the degree of racial division in the schools rather than upon
how the schools got that way. Again, such a test would require the
solution of very difficult problems, such as the prevention of
disadvantages to individuals or districts whose intent was proper and
lawful. But the confusion of intent and impact brought about by Keyes,
Columbus, andDayton prevented the Court from confronting and solving
such problems. Furthermore, it left majority-race members free to avoid
compliance by fleeing the district, and worse yet, it gave the district few

189. The school district's "affirmative duty" in this circumstance was not merely to avoid further
segregative acts, but rather to dismantle the dual system. See supranote 116 and accompanying text.
190. This conclusion follows because all other actions would have had the foreseeable effect of
maintaining segregation.
191. See supranotes 175-81 and accompanying text.
192. See 112S. Ct. 1430, 1447-48 (1992).
193. See id.
194. The causation presumption meant that "the plaintiffs will almost always win." Id. at 1452
(Scalia, J., concurring). The absence of such a presumption, however, also would be vulnerable to
criticism, because it would make proof difficult for plaintiffs. See id. (Scalia, J., observing that if
plaintiffs are required to meet an ordinary burden of proof, "the plaintiffs will almost always lose").
Justice Scalia elsewhere points out that if plaintiffs fail for lack of proof, this result follows from the
erosion of the inference by the passage of time, and he argues that the Court "should consider laying
aside the extraordinary, and increasingly counterfactual, presumption of [causation]." Id. at
1453-54.
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tools to answer this problem-or to avoid further liability, for having
happen to it that which it was powerless to prevent.
These decisions were salutary in that they were based upon clear
principles. Furthermore, the principles vindicated the law and redressed
constitutional violations. The treatment of causation to which they
conduced, however, and the remedies that they implicated, lacked
flexibility to accommodate other factors. 9 5 The defect in the KeyesColumbus-Dayton H line of decisions thus was opposite from that in
Brown 11. These decisions were principled in the sense that they
provided clear vindication of the law, but they lacked pragmatism.'96
They were widely, and understandably, perceived simply as unfair,
however much abstract logic their supporters might have been able to
195. They did not tell the district court, for example, how to treat a case in which the current
school board was acting in good faith or in which the events triggering the presumption were remote
in time. Cf.infra part IV(A) (describing Freeman decision, including its recognition of these two
factors). Furthermore, the causation-presumption decisions required a decree commensurate with the
violation, without telling the lower courts how to take account of parental reactions to a draconian
decree-even if the result was a population flight from the district that undermined the decree. See
infra note 196 and accompanying text.
196. Perhaps it can be argued that the Court simply did not go far enough with the principle, as
the plaintiffs argued in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken 1]and
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken I]. There, the plaintiffs sought
metropolitan consolidation to counteract the segregative effects of migration across school district
lines. The majority denied relief. Dissenters in Milliken I argued that failure to dissolve school
districts and reconstitute them as consolidated would mean that "deliberate acts of segregation and
their consequences [would] go unremedied." 418 U.S. at 763 (White, J., dissenting, joined by
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.).
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it would have required more drastic
gerrymandering of attendance zones and transportation of children over greater distances. The limits
contemplated by the Swann decision presumably would have stopped the extension of these
remedies at a point short of complete desegregation even if the courts had ordered consolidation
across school district borders. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the
argument for consolidation depended upon the assumption that courts had power to remedy
migration undertaken by individual parents, whose actions would not ordinarily be remediable under
the Constitution. Cf infra part IV(A) (discussing Spangler case). It could be argued that this
migration was influenced or caused by court decrees that were themselves made necessary by past
unconstitutional segregation; this argument, however, overlooked the fact that the decrees were
entered "in spite of and not because of' the resulting migration, as were the past segregative acts,
and therefore the Court's decisions confining the Constitution to intentional discrimination might
prevent a remedy. Cf. supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing Feeney and
McCleskey cases).
Finally, if the Court had been perceived as engaging in a "scorched earth" approach in which it
was prepared to subordinate all other considerations to the single goal of remedying all vestiges of
unconstitutional segregation, the Court probably would have precipitated a constitutional crisis. Cf.
supra notes 55-60 (discussing aftermath of Cooper v. Aaron). Even if the plaintiffs' positions in the
Milliken cases did not necessarily implicate such a scorched-earth remedy, the danger of a crisis
based upon perceptions may have been sufficiently real to have been a consideration against the
consolidation the plaintiffs there sought.
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muster to defend them. The result was a flight of parents from school
districts in which they had lost confidence and in which local autonomy
was gone.' 97 Although the factor of local autonomy was what had
prompted some districts to resist desegregation in the first place, it also
was what forged parents' identity with and interest in their schools. It
was important to their perceptions of educational quality. Their
consequent actions sometimes have been referred to as white flight, 198
and perhaps that label sometimes has been fair; enough motivation for
such migration, however, could often come from a loss of confidence
that was not based on color or prejudice. In either event, the result often
was resegregation.
These principled-but-not-pragmatic decisions
contained the seeds of their own defeat, just as the pragmatic-but-notprincipled ones did.
Furthermore, the Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton decisions must be
viewed in the context of Milliken v. Bradley,99 in which the Court
generally disapproved metropolitan consolidation as a remedy. The
Court excepted cases in which discriminatory intent had prompted the
initial creation of district lines. This condition, however, rarely could be
demonstrated; instead, the plaintiff's concern (and that of adversely
affected school districts) usually was that district lines originally set up
for other purposes were facilitating white flight.
It is possible that a different decision in Milliken would have made
little difference in practical results, because disgruntled parents might
have used private schools, moved to wholly different metropolitan areas,
or migrated to schools so far distant by bus from the central city that
satelliting was impractical. On the other hand, it is possible that the
opposite result in Milliken could have had a substantial impact, although
at great economic and social cost-since flight could not be achieved just
across the district border. No certainty in this area can ever be
established, although the likelihood seems overwhelming that an
opposite holding in Milliken would have made some difference in the
incentive to leave affected districts. To that extent, Milliken encouraged
flight; and to that extent, it can be argued that it aggravated the lack of
pragmatism in Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton.

197. Cf Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (refusing to order interdistrict consolidation as a remedy
to such migration; discussed supra note 196).
198. E.g., Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1453 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
199. Milliken 1, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See generally supranote
196 (expanding upon the Milliken cases).
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IV. SPANGLER, DOWELL, AND FREEMAN. TERMINATING
SUPERVISION
After years or even decades of effort, some schcol districts began
producing conditions that could support arguments for terminating court
supervision. These arguments resulted in a series of cases from 1976 to
1992 that defined the conditions under which termination lawfully could
occur. The resulting decisions, like the earlier opinions following Brown
/, combine varying elements of principle and pragmatism.
A.

The Spangler, Dowell, and Freeman Decisions

The Pasadena School Board, after a finding against it of official
segregation, was subjected to a remedial order that required it to insure
each year that there would be no school "with a majority of any minority
students." '
The school district achieved that condition, and, in 1974,
filed a motion with the district court to remove the "no-majority"
requirement."' The district court denied the motion and stated that the
no-majority requirement was an inflexible one to be applied anew each
school year, even if changes in the racial mix in the schools were caused
by factors for which the school district was not responsible.0 2 In
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, the Supreme Court, per
Justice Rehnquist, held that the district court must modify the decree to
eliminate the no-majority requirement. 3
In some respects, Spangler was a relatively simple decision: the
Supreme Court rejected a "substantive constitutional right [to a]
particular degree of racial balance or mixing," which the Court in Swann
expressly had held.2 4 To both the majority and the dissent, however, the
case was not quite that simple. Race-specific migration had changed the
effects of the remedial decree, and the real issue in the case concerned
what to do about that fact. To the majority, it was dispositive that there
was "no showing" that the changes in racial composition "were in any
manner caused by segregative actions chargeable to the defendants."2 5
Since, instead, the "quite normal pattern of human migration resulted in

200. Pasadena City Bd. ofEduc. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,428 (1976).
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 42 8-29.
Id. at 431,435.
Id. at431-32.
Id. at 434 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971)).
Id. at 435.
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some changes in the demographics," and since unitary status had earlier
been achieved, the resulting racial imbalances were not de jure
segregation.2" 6 To the dissent, this reasoning begged the question: the
school district's procedures for hiring and promotion, or other aspects of
school quality, might informally mark schools as black or white. Thus,
these factors might still result in de jure segregation of school attendance.
As the dissent saw it, it was important "that the system may not have
achieved 'unitary' status in all other respects," although that
consideration was "irrelevant" to the majority.2" 7
The Dowell case concerned a district court's dissolution of a 1972
decree on the grounds that it no longer was working and that the school
board had complied in good faith for more than a decade. The plaintiffs
argued that the court should have applied a far more stringent standard.
They pointed to language in previous decisions holding that such a
modification generally requires a showing of "grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions." 2 8 Further, the plaintiffs attacked the
school board's recent student reassignment plan, which reduced busing
burdens but increased the number of one-race schools.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
emphasized that school desegregation decrees differ from most kinds of
2 9
final judgments in that they "are not intended to operate in perpetuity.""
2
1
0
Past compliance "is obviously relevant," as is the question whether
"vestiges of discrimination" have been "eliminated to the extent
practicable. ' 21
This two-part inquiry, and not the more stringent
standard for other kinds of final judgments, was to guide the district
court upon remand in considering whether to dissolve the decree.212
Three dissenters, led by Justice Marshall, argued that the decree could
not be lifted even if the two-part inquiry were to be answered positively,
because "feasible steps [still] could be taken to avoid one-race
213
schools.

206. Id. at 436.
207. Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 632 (1991) (quoting United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
209. Id. at 637 (rejecting as precedent United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932)).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 638.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Then came Freeman."4 In some respects, Freeman was similar to
Spangler and Dowell; in other respects, however, it was radically
different. Most importantly, resegregation in Freeman was dramatic:
"The District Court found that '[a]s the result of these demographic
shifts, the population of the northern half of DeKalb County is now
predominantly white and the southern half of DeKalb County is
predominantly black."' 215 Fifty percent of African-American students
attended schools that were over ninety percent black. Of twenty-two
high schools, "five had student populations that were more than ninety
percent black, while five other schools had student populations that were
more than eighty percent white," and the pattern was similar in
elementary schools. 1 6
Nevertheless, the district court found that its 1969 order had
"'effectively desegregated [the school district] for a period of time' with
respect to student assignment."21 7 The Court had to leap several hurdles
to reach this conclusion. First, two schools were virtually all-black even
after the 1969 order.2" 8 Rapid black migration from Atlanta had caused
the imbalance in a very short period of time.219 The Supreme Court
stated that this phenomenon was "illustrative of the problems" inherent
in the effort to "integrat[e] the whole district."
Furthermore, the
district court found that several aspects of the school district, factors
identified as important in Green, remained tainted with vestiges of de
jure segregation.22 Most importantly, faculty assignments and per pupil
expenditures were still unconstitutionally unequal. 2 Finally, the district
court considered a less tangible, non-Green factor-the quality of
education offered to white and black student populations-and found
that it was still infected with constitutional inequalities. 2"
These issues raised, again, the issue of causation-an issue that had
been central in Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton II-as well as the
somewhat different, but closely related issue whether a school district

214.
215.
216.
217.

112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
Id. at 1438.
Id.
Id. at 1439.

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1441.
222. Id. at 1441-42.
223. Id. at 1442.
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was "unitary." The Supreme Court recognized that these terms were
ambiguous. 4 They also were value-laden. "[T]he term 'unitary,"' said
the Court, "is not a precise concept;" what it really signifies is "a school
system which has been brought into compliance with the command of
the Constitution."
Perhaps more importantly, the Court relaxed the
concept of causation that had been treated more rigidly in Dayton II. "In
one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decrees do
remain in our society and in our schools," wrote the Court.226 Past
wrongs were "a stubborn fact of history;" but though the nation could not
escape its history, "neither must we overstate its consequences in fixing
legal responsibilities." 7 Thus, vestiges of segregation remained a
concern of the law even if "subtle and intangible," but nonetheless, for
plaintiffs to justify legal intervention, "they must be so real that they
have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied. 22 8
The key to the Court's reasoning in this regard was contained in two
sentences that gave significance to time remoteness and to good faith.
As to the first factor, time, "[a]s the de jure violation becomes more
remote in time and these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less
likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of
the prior de jure system." ' 9 Second, as to good faith, "[tlhe causal link
between current conditions and the prior violation is even more
attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good faith." 0 It
was on the basis of these twin factors that the Court hinged its distinction
of Columbus and Dayton II.
B.

The Elusive Inference of Causation

Causation, then, is at the heart of the Spangler,Dowell, and Freeman
cases, and the key to understanding them is to recognize that they reflect
a more flexible view of causality than the decisions that preceded them.
In fact, the concept of causation is an exceedingly awkward one.
"Cause" is not a scientific or absolute concept; it instead is a legal
conclusion, based upon multiple and sometimes conflicting factors, about

224. Id. at 1443-44.
225. Id. (quoting in part Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 636 (1991)).
226. Id. at 1448.
227. Id.
228. Id. (emphasis omitted).
229. Id. (emphasis omitted).
230. Id.
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fixing responsibility or blame. 31 After Dayton II, the tsst for fixing legal
responsibility was so severe that it could have ensnared people and
school districts whose conduct was only remotely related to the
conditions at issue. 2 Whether Freeman strikes the right balance is a
more difficult philosophical question.
Scientists tend to avoid the nebulous concept of "cause. ' ' 3 As a
matter of strict logic, the inference of causation is inductive rather than
deductive, and it always is subject to imperfection. 4 Worse, it usually is
based upon the maxim of post hoc ergo propter hoc." We may observe,
for example, that individuals who regularly eat breakfast tend to live
longer; a scientist would express this concept cautiously, saying that this
regular habit was "correlated" with longevity. If an individual who never
ate breakfast died prematurely, the scientist would consider it not only
erroneous but largely meaningless to conclude that he had died
"because" of this factor. The treacherous nature of this reasoning is
demonstrated by the hypothetical inference that, because every
individual who has died drank water at some point in his or her life, the
fact that a given person drank water "caused" his or her death. 6
Inferences about the relationship between racial imbalances in
metropolitan schools and long-past acts of de jure segregation may not
be as glaringly counterintuitive as these examples. The quality of the
inference is improved by the experience upon which it is based as well as
our understanding of a plausible causal mechanism. Nevertheless, it is
important to remember that such inferences of causation, even with a
long history and a credible mechanism, still are treacherous. A
metropolitan school district is a fluid, dynamic entity. 7 Migration is
influenced by changing neighborhood patterns, employment locations,
and private preferences concerning the ethnicity of one's surroundings,
as well as by vestiges of de jure segregation.? In addition, it is shaped

231. See supranote 30 and authority therein cited.
232. Cf supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the causation
presumption meant "the plaintiffs will almost always win").
233. See supranote 30.
234. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES

74-78 (1988) (discussing the criticisms of inductive reasoning asserted by David Hume, John
Brennan, and BertrandRussell).
235. Id.
236. For other critiques of this reasoning, see id.
237. Justice Scalia gave the description most focused on this issue in Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430,
1451 (1992).
238. Id.
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by parental perceptions of school conditions, including negative
perceptions that are induced by drastic court-ordered remedies for de jure
segregation.
One can easily hypothesize a situation in whieh a court enters a
serious and thorough remedy for vestiges of de jure segregation,
involving zoning, pairing, clustering, and noncontiguous (or "satellite")
zoning of the kind authorized in Swann.2 9 Such a remedy would
probably entail increased incidence and duration of bus transportation,
and it would also entail the disadvantage of lack of parental identification
with the neighborhood school. Parents might be expected to react
negatively to such a decree. Their reactions might be based upon
perceptions of lowered educational quality, or upon distaste for their
children being placed in schools in which they are racially in the
minority, or even upon outright racial hostility; in any event, the Court's
decisions indicate that this individual decision is not redressable under
the Constitution.24 Neither is the aggregative effect of such decisions by
many parents unless it can be related to de jure segregation. It is possible
that these parental decisions, in the aggregate, may undermine the effect
of a desegregation decree to such an extent that the school district is as
" '
segregated as, or more segregated than, it was before.24
In such circumstances, has the resegregation been "caused" by the
original de jure segregation? In one sense, the answer is no, because it is
more immediately "caused" by private decisions that are not cognizable
under the Constitution. In another sense, however, such resegregation is
indeed caused by the original de jure segregation, because without such
official racial discrimination, the remedial decree would never be
necessary, and by hypothesis, most of the resegregative effect is the
product of the remedial decree. It appears that Freeman rejects this latter
reasoning by its insistence upon not overvaluing the effect of undeniable
historical wrongs.242 The two factors, good faith and lapse of time, at
some point would cut off the claim that de jure segregation was the legal
cause.

243

Tort law has evolved the concept of "proximate" causation, rather
than simply "causation," to take account of these difficulties. As a
239. See supranotes 125-26 and accompanying text.
240. Cf. supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (commenting that the absence of causation
by official segregation negates constitutional violation).
241. See supranotes 152-53 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
243. See supranotes 229-30 and accompanying text.
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general proposition, proximate causation implies three elements. 2 " The
first is "but for" causation, or the inference that an event would not have
happened but for the liability-producing conduct. The second is a
requirement of direct and continuous sequence, or the concept of a chain
of causation that can be broken by intervening factors or by remoteness
in time and space. The third factor is foreseeability.
Arguably, the line of cases culminating in Freeman tends toward this
concept of proximate causation, rather than but-for causation: the idea of
time remoteness tends to rebut the existence of a direct and continuous
sequence, and the good faith of the school board tends to rebut the
foreseeability of causation. The Freeman opinion even refers to the
relevant causation principle as linking the cause to the prior violation "in
a proximate way."245
C.

Causation,Remedies, Principle,andPragmatism

Ultimately, the question of causation is bound up with another issue:
what are our objectives in ordering a remedy? If our objective is to
eliminate the effects of de jure segregation in the individual school
district at issue, we might favor one kind of decree.246 If our objective is
to "send a message" to other school districts so that they will avoid
unconstitutional conduct, we might favor a different kind of decree
altogether.247 If we want to vindicate the court's authority, we might
favor yet another kind of decree. 24" Finally, if we are attempting to
achieve all of these objectives while at the same time preserving other
values (such as local political autonomy and equal. treatment of all
students subject to the decree), we might favor a still different kind of
decree.

244. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 41-45, at 263-361 (discussing
proximate causation).
245. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1447 (1992).
246. Such a decree might, for example, emphasize pragmatic workability rather than clear and
consistent articulation of principle.
247. Such a decree might emphasize principle at the expense of pragmatic workability. Cf. supra
note 246 and accompanying text. In fact, if the decree places unattainable burdens and unworkable
duties on a school board, it may communicate the disastrous result to others with greater clarity,
although it then may become unfairly onerous and incapable of causing sound results in the
immediate case.
248. One example is by adopting rigid and "formalistic" requirements and insisting on their
fulfillment irrespective of the ultimate objective. Cf. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1449-50 (implicitly
rejecting such "formalism").
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In concrete terms, if we were trying to remedy official segregation, we
would make an effort to separate the unofficial from the official
segregation and remedy only those effects "caused" by the latter.249 The
reason we would do so is because we would have to recognize that overremediation would carry the seeds of its own destruction: it would
threaten the values of those subject to the decree, and it would prompt
them to act so as to undermine the intended effect." ° On the other hand,
if our intent is to "send a message," we could afford to be more loose
about causation. In fact, we could best convey to other school districts
that we are serious about getting results by being punitive-i.e., by
interpreting past misconduct presumptively as causally related to present
effects." 1 If we are overinclusive, we might think that the only
consequence is that we can send a stronger message. This latter
reasoning emerges from some of the rhetoric in the Columbus and
Dayton cases, particularly 52
The reality, however, is that most institutional remedies are designed
to fulfill both of these functions-that is, both to remedy the individual
case and to send a message-in greater or lesser measures. Rarely does a
court attempt to craft a decree purely for the purpose of deterring
antisocial conduct by others, without caring whether it will do justice in
the case before it. Likewise, a court makes a mistake if it does individual
justice by reasoning that is indifferent to the message (or lack of a
message) that it sends to others. A remedial decree (and hence our
concept of causation) must do some of both if it is to be successful in the
long run: it must send a clear message, and it must work to achieve the
just result in the immediate case. 3
All of which is to say that an institutional remedy must be both
principled and pragmatic. When additional values such as local
autonomy and equality of impact are added, the picture becomes even
more complex. We must adjust both the message and the result in the
immediate case to take account of these factors. Then we must go back
to consider whether the tinkering leaves the principle intact and the
pragmatism still working.

249. Cf id. at 1449 (stating: "A proper rule must be based on the necessity to find a feasible
remedy that insures systemwide compliance with the court decree and that is directed to curing the
effects of the specific violation.").
250. See supra notes 153, 241 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
252. See suprapart re(B).
253. Cf supra note 249 (quoting statement in Freemanexplaining purposes of remedy).
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When measured against these criteria, the Spangler, Dowell, and
Freeman decisions offer hope for a better aftermath than has followed
most of the Court's earlier desegregation cases. These termination-ofsupervision decisions mark a retreat from the Court's most far-reaching
reasoning about causation, particularly that in Dayton f.254 They are
more pragmatic. They try, at least, to shrink the desegregation decree
where it is least needed,255 and where it is most important to recognize
other values." 6 They can be expected to lead to less resistance and
avoidance. Thus one can hope that they will produce results in the long
run (maybe the very long run) in which both the political system and
private decisions will be minimally affected by official racial
discrimination.
Yet at the very same time, these decisions preserve clear principles.
They require that, before it can shrink the desegregation decree, the
district court must inquire whether de jure segregation still has vestiges
in the schools.257 This inquiry, in turn, is governed for the most part by
clear questions, such as whether the existence of one-race schools is
explainable by private rather than public decisions." Before the district
court can lift the desegregation decree, it must have a concrete basis for
the hope that it will not thereby disadvantage future generations of
children.
D.

The RemainingProblem: "Private"Decisions Taintedby Official
Encouragement

The Freeman opinion does, however, leave one important question
undefined. The Court's opinion, as well as some of the concurring
opinions, emphasize the need to determine whether private migration
patterns are causally linked to official segregation. 9 If private housing
patterns can be said to have "caused" racial imbalances in the schools,
254. See suprapart III(B).
For an alternative view, in fable form, see Derrick Bell, The Racial PreferenceLicensing Act: A
Fable About the Politics ofHate, A.B.A. J. at 50, 53 (Sept. 1992) (asserting, "Today, whites have
concluded, as they did a century ago, that the country has done enough for black people despite the
flood of evidence to the contrary."). Professor Bell's concerns in this article center upon other issues
but are broad enough to include school desegregation.
255. That is, in pupil assignments, which represent one of the most significant areas in which
school decrees have intruded into democratic choices-by requiring long-distance busing.
256. For example, in faculty assignments, in which official causation is clearer.
257. E.g., Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1449 (1992).
258. E.g., id. at 1440.
259. Id. at 1448.
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but de jure segregation earlier "caused" those private housing patterns,
then it can be argued that the initial de jure segregation "caused" the
current imbalances, irrespective of the fact that private decisions not
redressable under the Constitution were a mediating factor.
On the one hand, this inquiry has a certain logic to it. If our task is to
eliminate vestiges of official segregation "root and branch, '2 60 this
indirect effect through official encouragement of racial housing choices
sounds like one of the branches that is required to be eliminated. There
is support in past decisions (for example, Reitman v. Mulkey)2 61 for
finding state action in private decisions that are encouraged by official
approbation. One can also imagine clear cases of official encouragement
that should not go unremedied. For example, the school district can
blatantly or subtly designate schools as black or white. A school district
that adopted a resolution encouraging black parents to decide in favor of
one school, and whites in favor of another, should not be beyond the
remedial power of a court having jurisdiction over a desegregation
decree. Neither should a district that names its schools after George
Wallace, George Washington Carver, and Benito Juarez as a slightly
more subtle means of marking which are black, white, and brown. In
262
fact, the Court decided an analogous case in United States v. Fordie,
the Mississippi higher education case, during the same term as Freeman.
Consistency of principle demands that the mediating effect of private
decisions should not stay the remedy in such a case.
On the other hand, such clear cases will be rare. The more common
question will be the one now faced by the lower courts, upon remand, in
Freeman: of the muddled mix of factors that could have brought about
the current racial mixture over the last three or four decades, which
actually is the cause?2 6' This question, however clumsy, is the inquiry
that the Court's holding requires. In many instances, it will be a question
without meaningful, humanly discernible answers, much as is the
question whether exposure to one among many risk factors has "caused"
an individual cancer. 2' Furthermore, far-reaching state action cases such

260. See supra part HI(A) (discussing Green and its progeny).
261. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). But cf infra note 265 and accompanying text (discussing the arguable
effect of later cases in undermining Reitnan holding).
262. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (finding causation by official segregation despite ostensible
desegregation where historical events effected designation of dual systems).
263. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
264. Cf.supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
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as Reitman v. Mulkey are not typical of the Supreme Court's state action
decisions, and they are hard to reconcile with other cases.26
In most instances, de jure segregation will have caused a court decree
to issue, which in turn will have caused official reaction. That effect, in
turn, will have caused a wide variety of individual parental decisions,
which, in their aggregate, will have caused further action by the school
board, or further decrees by the court. This cycle will have caused
another cycle of official action-decree-private decision, which in turn
will have caused yet another, throughout the history of the school district
from Brown to the present. All of these cycles will have occurred while
the metropolitan area has been buffeted by a myriad of other economic,
geographical, political, and social changes, so that now it has a
completely different size, shape and set of demographics than it did when
the duty to desegregate was established. In this context, it is difficult to
make meaningful determinations of causation.266 If the Supreme Court
means that an exacting inquiry is to be undertaken along these lines, the
lower courts face an unenviable task-indeed, an impossible one.
There are indications, however, that the Freeman Court does not
intend for the law to weave a net so fine as to include causes disclosed by
such a diffuse, multiple-cycle analysis. First, Freeman takes pains to
point out that although history may have influenced current events, that
fact alone does not amount to proof of causation.267 Second, Freeman
allows the school district to rebut causation by showing that the violation
was distant in time."' Third, good faith now matters, and presumably it
cannot be overcome by mere racial imbalances linked to distant
violations only by a presumption. 9 Finally, the Court's concerns seem
to be targeted at relatively recent segregative actions of a kind that
"designate" or "mark" a school as black or white in a way that would
naturally provide strong encouragement to current segregation in housing

265. Compare Reitman, 387 U.S. 369, with e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)
(holding that private foreclosure of lien without due process is not state action despite authorization
by statute); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that privately owned
utility is not engaged in state action despite monopoly status conferred by state or other state
involvement). It should be added, however, that racial discrimination appears to prompt the Court to
lower the threshold for finding state action. E.g., Georgia v. MeCollun 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992)
(holding that private criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is state action, so that
racial discrimination is unlawful).
266. See supranotes 237-38 and accompanying text.
267. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992).
268. Id.
269. Id.
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patterns, such as by racially discernible funding or faculty
composition.270
If the causation inquiry is guided by these considerations, it should be
workable. In particular, a court should not presume lightly that private
housing decisions have been "caused" by official segregation. That
approach would exalt principle excessively over pragmatism. It would
sweep school officials who act in good faith with the same overinclusive
broom as those (few, it is to be hoped, today) who actually encourage
private decisions as a surrogate for other kinds of official segregation.
E.

RacialDeterminantsin PrivateHousingDecisions: The Nub of the
Problem

There is an additional reason, contained in Freeman, for this
conclusion. The evidence before the district court included survey
results that showed the racial component of private housing decisions. If
this evidence was to be credited, African-Americans as individuals tend
to prefer residential areas to be 50 percent black and 50 percent white,
but whites as individuals tend to prefer a decidedly more imbalanced
neighborhood-one that is 80 percent white and 20 percent black.27 The
implications of this evidence (if it is true) are significant: they mean that
the aggregate of migration by persons of all races would consistently
defeat any effort at racial balancing by court decree, even if that were the
objective. 2 Stated in a way that is more to the point, this evidence leads
to the conclusion that private migration in response to private preferences
would produce a degree of racial imbalance that conceivably could

270. Id. at 1447 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32
(1971) to the effect that judicial intervention "should not be necessary" unless the state has
attempted to influence demographic patterns for the purpose of segregating schools). See id. at
1454-55 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing racially "identifiable" schools); id. at 1458 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (discussing "earmarking" of schools).
271. Id. at 1448.
For a striking example of this phenomenon in a different context, see Barbara Kantrowitz & Susan
Miller, Still Separate after 20 Years: Segregated Reunionsfor an Integrated Class, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 7, 1992, at 62. This article reports upon school populations that were desegregated under the
law during their educations-but that acted through individuals, decades later, to conduct segregated
reunions. One African-American woman, whose group refused an invitation to join white
classmates in a desegregated reunion, explained: "People feel comfortable with their own." Id.
There certainly is room to regret the factors that produce this impulse. The questions whether, and
how, the law could or should remedy these phenomena are far more difficult.
272. This is especially so given the frequency of migration in our society; in one recent year, 17.6
percent of the entire national population changed households. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1447-48.
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account for the racially divided demographics of many school systems
whether they once were de jure segregated or not.
Further efforts by a court to remedy this kind of racial imbalance
could be expected to be defeated by the homeostltic mechanism of
private migration that is driven by racially influenced, but private,
preferences.2 73 It might be argued that this conclusion particularly
follows in light of the Court's holding in Milliken 127, and Milliken 11.275
Class and wealth differences presumably would increase the division.
Since perfect 50-50 or 80-20 neighborhoods would not uniformly appear,
and since statistical variations could be expected, imbalances of more
than 90-10 could be expected to exist as well. Irrespective of the merits
of these private preferences, they provide an explanation for racial
imbalances that should reinforce a reluctance to presume that imbalanced
housing patterns are the result of official encouragement. At the same
time, they show why neighborhood school assignment should have been
the most immediate remedy-way back in 1955, in Brown 11276 -to be
supplemented by other remedies as necessary.
F.

Another View: The Relevance of RacialDivision and Continued
Vestiges of the DualSystem

The opinions in Freeman thus are capable of a workable
interpretation, one based upon a concept of cause analogous to the tort
law of proximate causation, interpreted through the two factors of good
faith and time remoteness. One must remember, however, that the Court
remanded the case for reconsideration. As previous sections of this
Article have shown, the justices saw two contradictory sides to the story,
one involving a school district that had made great strides toward unitary
status through good faith and hard work, and the other a district that
remained largely divided by race and in which faculty assignments,
funding, and educational quality were still affected by official
segregation.
The question therefore remains, what significance should be afforded
to these other factors which make up the unpleasant side of Freeman?
Does the pragmatic workability of the test modeled upon proximate
causation outweigh them, and is that test better targeted without them?
273.
274.
275.
276.

796

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
418 U.S. 717 (1974); see supranote 196 for a discussion of this case.
433 U.S. 267 (1977); see supranote 196 for a discussion of Milliken I and Milliken If.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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The answer is that the district courts will need to continue considering
all vestiges of the dual system, in addition to the degree of racial division
in pupil assignments. The Court's good faith test implicitly requires this
analysis. The degree of racial division that remains in the system is
relevant to, even if not solely determinant of, good faith, just as racial
impact is relevant to the issue of intent. Considerations of inequitable
funding, discrimination in faculty assignments, and uneven educational
quality are also relevant. By placing the burden of proof on the
defendant district, the Court has ensured that the district will have
difficulty in emerging from supervision of pupil assignments if it remains
dramatically divided by race, or if other vestiges of the dual system
remain.
It was for this reason, presumably, that the Court traced so carefully
the neutral, migration-based explanations underlying DeKalb County's
one-race schools. Likewise, it was because of the remaining vestiges of
segregation in faculty assignments, funding and quality, that the Court
remanded for consideration of the causal relationship of these factors to
racial divisions. The opinion does not point the way to an easy path for a
still-divided school district to terminate supervision, and perhaps this is
as it should be.
V.

CONCLUSION

The lessons of the journey from Brown to Freeman have been painful
ones. In particular, Brown H and some of its progeny show how not to
write a decision about institutional reform. It is important for such a
decree to be principled, so that it will send a clear message that can and
will be followed by those subject to it. But it is also important that the
decree be pragmatic, in the sense of doing workable justice over the
range of situations to which it will be applied. It is difficult to achieve
both of these conditions, and in fact they often point in different
directions.
A principled decree helps elected officials to follow the law without
offending democratic values. It also enables lower courts to ensure
compliance. It motivates others to comply. And it increases the
likelihood of justice in the individual case. The Brown II decision was
deficient in all of these respects. It would have been better if the Court
had begun by laying down a simple principle such as assignment to
neighborhood schools, even if there remained many cases in which more
extensive decrees might have been necessary. As it was, in many school
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districts, Brown II did not accomplish results that even could approach
the probable effect of a neighborhood schools decree.
An institutional reform decree must also be pragmatic. One of the
unfortunate aspects of Brown II is that it led to a need for future
decisions, after the swing of the pendulum, that exalted principle to the
exclusion of pragmatism. Thus Dayton 11, with its combination of the
Keyes presumption, the foreseeable effects doctrine, and the presumption
of causation, particularly when added to the degree-cf-racial-imbalance
starting point of Swann, led to a regime in which the instances of
individual injustice were too many and too great. A decree that lacks
pragmatism, in this way, may lead to resistance and evasion so pervasive
that they undermine its purpose. The absence of flexibility may foster a
perception that the law costs too much in terms of democracy and
autonomy. The people subject to the decree, particularly if they are
numerous and diffuse, find ways to frustrate its objectives.
There is room for hope that the termination-of-supervision decisions
have struck the right balance. The six Green factors point the lower
courts adequately to standards that they can coherently apply.277 The
Freeman decision thus is principled; it requires termination when the
standard is met but preserves court supervision when it is not met. At the
same time, the new regime is more pragmatic than the logic of presumed
causation and treatment of unitary status that came from Dayton II.
But the Freeman Court did leave the lower courts with one concept
that could be as bad a guide as the nonstandard of Brown 11 if it is
handled wrong. The justices required the lower courts to ascertain
whether racially imbalanced housing patterns were tainted by official
encouragement of private decisions. The Court was right to consider this
possibility, since official segregation could be perpetuated by this means,
and in some cases it will be detectable. At the same time, it will be
important for the lower courts to treat this causation inquiry
pragmatically, since the myriad of potential influences upon the
demographics of a metropolitan center over decades are not subject to
precise measurement. There is some danger that -this unanswerable
inquiry will prompt judges to find illegal causes by overly long
inferences. The Supreme Court was right to preserve this principle, but
the lower courts will be wrong if they do not treat it pragmatically.
A pragmatic concept of causation, with some of the features of the tort
concept of "proximate" cause, is called for in the application of this
277. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text (showing how the Freeman Court applied
the Green factors).
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indirect encouragement principle.27 The Freeman opinion indicates the
Court majority does not wish to encourage the inference of causation
from distant sources upon diffuse and dubious evidence. Yet the impact
of past segregative practices will still be a paramount issue, since to
consider good faith, a district court must evaluate the present vestiges of
the past-including funding, educational quality, and the remaining
degree of racial division. If they follow Freeman in this manner, the
lower courts may be able to shrink the desegregation decree in the proper
cases-and avoid shrinking the kids.

278. See suprapart IV(B).

